Ukrainian Witness | War in Ukraine | ️ 📍  The Tochnyi team analyzed the gradual degradation of Russia’s mil...

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2025-12-06

Ukrainian Witness | War in Ukraine

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💭🔵 ❗️ 📍  The Tochnyi team analyzed the gradual degradation of Russia’s military logistics, which evolved from forced dispersion of depots to critical supply problems at the front by 2026. 🔗 Link ➡️ Disrupting Russian Road Logistics in Occupied UkraineIntroduction (2022–2024 shift)The war’s logistics changed in two major phases:🟠 June 2022 – HIMARS impact: Ukrainian precision strikes forced Russia to move command posts and ammunition depots out of range, dispersing logistics and reducing coordination efficiency.🟠 2023–2026 – FPV drone revolution: FPV drones created a growing “kill zone” (initially ~10 km, later up to ~30–35 km), forcing Russia to abandon heavy trucks near the frontline and switch to motorcycles, ATVs, and small civilian vehicles.🟠 Later, longer-range UAVs expanded strikes deeper (30–150 km), increasingly targeting logistics convoys, depots, and transport infrastructure.➡️ 01. Maritime logistics (Kerch & Sea of Azov)🟠 Kerch ferry crossing became a key supply route after repeated attacks on other logistics lines.🟠 Multiple strikes since 2024 damaged or destroyed Ro-Ro ferries (Avangard, Slavyanin, Conro Trader).🟠 Port strikes in Mariupol and Berdiansk hit fuel storage, cranes, and vessels.Result: maritime logistics in the Sea of Azov are heavily reduced and unreliable.➡️ 02. Railways🟠 2025: coordinated strikes on railway stations, traction substations, and chokepoints.🟠 2026: shift toward direct attacks on moving trains and locomotives.🟠 Recorded 28 strikes in early 2026 across Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, and border regions.🟠 Temporary rail disruptions occurred, including Donetsk–Yasynuvata line.➡️ 03. Logistics facilities (depots & bases)🟠 Continuous targeting of fuel, ammo, and equipment depots since 2022.🟠 Increased intensity after 2025 with mid-range UAVs (Fire Point systems).🟠 Strikes concentrated near railway hubs and rear settlements in occupied territories.🟠 Result: fragmentation and relocation of storage deeper into occupied or Russian territory.➡️ 04. Ground logistics disruption (30–150 km zone)🟠 New generation UAVs expanded strike depth significantly.Increasing attacks on: 🟠 moving convoys🟠 supply trucks🟠 air defense escortsReported changes in Russian logistics: 🟠 convoy restrictions and escort requirements🟠 relocation of depots deeper (60–100+ km)Operational impact: reduced convoy efficiency and slower resupply cycles.➡️ 05. Main road supply routesUkrainian drone strikes focus on four main logistics corridors:🟠 Pokrovsk direction routes (T-05-11, M04/E50) – frontline supply disruptionDonetsk–Luhansk axis (Debaltseve, Horlivka, Yenakiieve) – key internal logistics network🟠 Donetsk–Mariupol (N-20) – major southern distribution route🟠 E58 coastal highway (“Azov Ring”) – critical strategic corridor along Sea of AzovEffects:vehicles increasingly struck at depthnight convoys becoming commonsome routes partially abandoned or rerouted➡️ 05C. “Azov Ring” infrastructure🟠 Long-term Russian project linking Rostov–Mariupol–Melitopol–Crimea.🟠 Uses E105 and E58 highways as backbone.Key hub: Melitopol.🟠 Ukraine targets electricity and telecom infrastructure to degrade coordination.🟠 Construction continues, but vulnerability to drone strikes remains high.➡️ 06. Moving forward🟠 Road closures increasing (E105, E50, Donetsk–Yasynuvata–Horlivka corridor).🟠 Russia shifting to secondary routes due to repeated strikes.🟠 Some drivers reportedly refuse fuel transport despite high pay.🟠 Logistics increasingly fragmented and unpredictable.➡️ Overall conclusionThe report describes a progressive collapse of Russian logistics efficiency in occupied Ukraine, driven by three waves:🟠 HIMARS (deep precision strikes on command/logistics nodes)🟠 FPV drones (frontline kill zone expansion)🟠 Mid-range UAVs (systemic interdiction of roads, rail, and convoys)🟠 The result is a shift from centralized logistics to fragmented, high-risk, and lower-capacity supply networks, with increasing dependence on alternative routes and smaller transport units
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