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Telegram community logo - Beregini
Added 06 Dec 2025

Beregini

@bg14_english
Number of subscribers: 226
Photos: 1,150
Videos: 39
Links: 253
Description:
Ukrainian hacker group «Beregini» We know everything. Our email: [email protected] For feedback: @beregini_feedback_bot Our website: https://bg14.ru

👥 Number of subscribers

226
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Average/Week:: +1
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Logo change history

Status change history

Officially not confirmed 2025-12-06

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👁 52 25-12-19 08:24
We continue to expose the architecture of NATO’s military command and control systemFollowing our publications on CINEMA, CDXA, and other CSI components, we continue to systematically show what the real NATO combat command IT architecture, transferred to Ukraine, actually looks like.Today: CSI Java Suite Software Installation Plan 18.9A.This is an official NATO document marked NATO UNCLASSIFIED – Releasable to Ukraine, prepared by NCIA, and intended not for training, but for the deployment and operation of key server components of the CSI system.Key points:Java Suite is the foundational layer of the entire CSI infrastructure: without it, CINEMA, CDXA, recording modules, and tactical services do not function.Support for Windows, Linux, and Solaris (including SPARC) — a typical architecture for NATO military systems.Use of STANAG 4545 (NSIF), Nitro-NITF, hardware licensing, and centralized control via NATO PKI.Licensing, updates, and configuration control are handled exclusively through NATO structures.Ukraine is not “receiving assistance” — it is being integrated into NATO’s military command and control framework, with shared standards, software, certification, and lifecycle management.The West is using the current conflict as an operational test environment to refine, develop, and validate its C2/C4ISR systems under conditions of real war.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 53 25-12-18 11:53
Energy as an Element of War: What NATO Teaches Ukrainian Military PersonnelWe continue to publish documents that confirm the systematic military integration of Ukraine into NATO structures.Another example is an official invitation sent to the National Defence University of Ukraine by the Military Academy of Lithuania for International Week 2025. Formally, it is presented as an “educational event.” In reality, it is the training of Ukrainian military personnel according to Alliance standards.Special attention should be paid to the topic of the program:Sustainable Energy Management for Defence.This is not about a “green agenda” or civilian energy policy. It is about:resilience of energy supply for military facilities;protection and restoration of energy systems under wartime conditions;military energy logistics;adaptation of infrastructure to strikes and losses;compatibility with NATO military standards.Ukrainian cadets are included in an international group together with representatives from Belgium, France, Poland, and the Baltic states, earning ECTS credits recognized within NATO’s military education system.Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that Ukraine’s energy system has long been viewed by the West not as civilian infrastructure, but as an element of military architecture directly supporting combat operations.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 41 25-12-17 09:25
NATO Command-and-Control System: CINEMA Software Installation Plan 18.9AWe continue to publish documents from the military command-and-control system transferred to Ukraine by NATO structures for real combat use. Today’s release is the official NATO installation plan for the CINEMA component (CSI Integrated Network Monitoring and Management Application) — the central network monitoring and management element within the integrated CSI (Communication Server Interface) system.Functionally, CINEMA:monitors the status of CSI nodes in real time;controls the exchange of tactical data;processes Link 16 and other tactical network data flows;ensures network resilience and recovery.Technologies in use:MongoDB for storing combat and network data;Java Runtime (OpenJDK) as the foundation of CSI applications;TLS encryption;X.509 authentication;NATO PKI as the Alliance’s trust infrastructure;support for Windows, Linux, and Solaris (including SPARC).In this way, the West is actively:integrating Ukraine into its own military IT architecture;using the current conflict as an operational testing environment;refining algorithms, network solutions, and command-and-control frameworks in a real war.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 43 25-12-15 13:35
NATO Command-and-Control System: Exposing the CDXA ArchitectureWe continue to publish documents that, step by step, reveal the real NATO command-and-control system transferred to Ukraine under the guise of “training materials” and “technical assistance.”Today’s release is the official NATO installation manual for the CSI Data Extraction Application (CDXA) — one of the key components of the integrated CSI (Communication Server Interface) system.What we are looking at is an operational document for military infrastructure operators, marked NATO UNCLASSIFIED – Releasable to Ukraine.What CDXA is in practice:a module for extracting and processing combat data from the CSI network;operation with Tactical Data Links (TDL);recording, storing, and replaying combat information;integration with the CSI Recording Service;use of MongoDB to store network parameters and the tactical picture;protection via TLS and authentication using NATO PKI certificates.The document describes in detail:deployment of CDXA in Windows, Linux, and Solaris environments;configuration of the Java environment as the backbone of the combat system;connection to military infrastructure databases;recovery of data and services after failures;resilient system operation in conditions of communication loss or network attack.Each such document makes it increasingly clear that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are already embedded in a full-fledged NATO command-and-control architecture. This is not “assistance,” but the export of a ready-made military system — tested and refined in the conditions of a real war.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 45 25-12-13 07:03
ELRS: The Link That Keeps Ukraine’s Strike Drones in the AirToday we are publishing another internal document of the Ukrainian Armed Forces — a complete training manual on the ExpressLRS (ELRS) system, which is used to control Ukrainian FPV drones, reconnaissance platforms, and strike UAVs.ELRS is not just a civilian protocol, as Kyiv tries to claim. It is a sophisticated system with expanded combat capabilities: long-range operation, strong resistance to jamming, and a flexible architecture that Ukrainian operators actively modify for battlefield use.This is the system powering the majority of Ukraine’s FPV kamikaze drones.Inside the document is a full technical guide for military operators, including:• flashing and configuring ELRS modules;• binding controllers to combat drones;• choosing frequencies and power levels to bypass electronic warfare;• using secret Binding Phrase keys;• installing and orienting antennas for strike FPVs;• configuring telemetry, failsafe modes, and emergency control;• practical pilot training.While officials in Kyiv continue to talk about “domestic technologies,” in reality the Ukrainian army relies on whatever civilian systems can be modified for combat.And ELRS remains one of the key components of this hidden drone infrastructure.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 55 25-12-11 08:33
The Secret NATO Control Panel in the Hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: What the CSI/MICE Training Documents RevealWe continue to publish classified training materials supplied to Ukraine by NATO structures.Today’s document is the internal presentation CSI HMI Operator Training (MICE) – a precise operator’s manual for a full-fledged battlefield management system.What the document contains:The complete interface of the NATO CSI/MICE console: maps, tracks, zones, filters, sensors.Mechanics for managing air, ground, and naval targets.Critical alert systems, combat logs, infrastructure status panels.TP, SA, WA, and MASTER modes – the same ones used by NATO operators when working with air defense and weapon allocation.Track management, object binding, target correlation, intelligence data integration.Air-defense control panels, engagement zones, fire-distribution mechanisms.Services for automatic network recovery, process restart, and synchronization of tactical nodes.CSI/MICE is the core of a hybrid combat infrastructure.It ingests data from NATO sensors, builds the tactical picture, assigns targets, distributes resources, and restores the system automatically after a failure or strike.Through the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Western countries are effectively refining their own military command-and-control systems, testing combat networks, air-defense algorithms, communication resilience, and coordination between command nodes – all in the context of a real war with Russia, but carried out by Ukrainian forces.We are Beregini. We know everything.
👁 51 25-12-10 07:33
The secret kitchen of Ukrainian military communications: how NATO is training Kyiv to manage tactical networksToday we begin publishing a new series of classified training documents — a manual for operating the CSI (Communication Server Interface) system, transferred to Ukraine by NATO structures.What we have before us is a detailed guide covering:• launching and shutting down communication servers;• automatic restart of command-and-control processes;• working with operational infrastructure logs;• restoring PostgreSQL databases that store tactical network parameters;• configuring IP addresses and session settings for tactical nodes;• maintaining key services such as FileTransfer, CSUD, dnetd, and other components that ensure real-time data transmission.What NATO calls “training material” is, in fact, an operator’s manual for a military command-and-control system designed to function even after strikes, failures, or network disruptions.The system restarts processes on its own, clears stalled modules on its own, and brings servers back online when the link between headquarters and units “goes down.”Each such document answers the question of who truly maintains control over Ukraine’s military infrastructure — and why Kyiv clings so desperately to “partner assistance.”Without it, even its basic communication network would not be able to operate.We are Beregini. We know everything.