Статистика telegram channel - @warinukraineua

💭❗️ 🤡📞 🇮🇱  'You’re fucking crazy': Trump fumes at Netanyahu over Lebanon escalation, — Axios 💬  President Trump lashed out at Israeli PM Netanyahu during a Monday call over Israel’s escalation in Lebanon, according to U.S. officials cited by Axios➡️  Why it matters:Iran threatened to withdraw from talks with the U.S. over Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Trump warned Netanyahu that further escalation could derail diplomacy➡️  Behind the scenes:Trump told Netanyahu that bombing Beirut would further isolate Israel globally and claimed he had helped keep him 'out of prison' during his corruption trial. One source summarized his remarks as: 📰 You’re fucking crazy… I’m saving your ass💬  A U.S. official said Trump was angry about civilian casualties and Israeli strikes destroying buildings to target individual Hezbollah commanders➡️  State of play:Israel reportedly dropped plans to strike targets in Beirut, though operations in southern Lebanon continue➡️  Between the lines:Officials described the call as one of the tensest since Trump returned to office. Trump also warned that escalation could collapse Iran negotiations, later posting that talks were continuing 'at a rapid pace'➡️  The other side:Netanyahu said Israel would continue operations unless Hezbollah stopped attacks. His office did not comment on the leak

⚡️🫡 🇪🇪 ➡️  Training with Ukrainian personnel has significantly improved Estonia’s drone capabilities over the past year, — The Baltic Sentinel ➡️📍  In 2025, a small Ukrainian drone team dominated NATO drills in Estonia, exposing major weaknesses in conventional forces by simulating the destruction of dozens of vehicles😬  Poor camouflage, large vehicle columns, and slow reactions to drones were identified as key problems➡️  In 2026, Estonian forces demonstrated better coordination, faster reaction to drone threats, and wider use of integrated digital command systems that combine multiple drone feeds with AI-assisted target recognition.🤖  The exercise also highlighted increased use of unmanned ground vehicles for logistics, evacuation, and resupply, supported by drone relay systems for communication resilience.💬  Ukrainian participants concluded that Estonia has made a clear technological and organizational leap within one year, significantly improving its ability to adapt to modern drone-centric warfare

💭🔵 ❗️ 📍  The Tochnyi team analyzed the gradual degradation of Russia’s military logistics, which evolved from forced dispersion of depots to critical supply problems at the front by 2026. 🔗 Link ➡️ Disrupting Russian Road Logistics in Occupied UkraineIntroduction (2022–2024 shift)The war’s logistics changed in two major phases:🟠 June 2022 – HIMARS impact: Ukrainian precision strikes forced Russia to move command posts and ammunition depots out of range, dispersing logistics and reducing coordination efficiency.🟠 2023–2026 – FPV drone revolution: FPV drones created a growing “kill zone” (initially ~10 km, later up to ~30–35 km), forcing Russia to abandon heavy trucks near the frontline and switch to motorcycles, ATVs, and small civilian vehicles.🟠 Later, longer-range UAVs expanded strikes deeper (30–150 km), increasingly targeting logistics convoys, depots, and transport infrastructure.➡️ 01. Maritime logistics (Kerch & Sea of Azov)🟠 Kerch ferry crossing became a key supply route after repeated attacks on other logistics lines.🟠 Multiple strikes since 2024 damaged or destroyed Ro-Ro ferries (Avangard, Slavyanin, Conro Trader).🟠 Port strikes in Mariupol and Berdiansk hit fuel storage, cranes, and vessels.Result: maritime logistics in the Sea of Azov are heavily reduced and unreliable.➡️ 02. Railways🟠 2025: coordinated strikes on railway stations, traction substations, and chokepoints.🟠 2026: shift toward direct attacks on moving trains and locomotives.🟠 Recorded 28 strikes in early 2026 across Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, and border regions.🟠 Temporary rail disruptions occurred, including Donetsk–Yasynuvata line.➡️ 03. Logistics facilities (depots & bases)🟠 Continuous targeting of fuel, ammo, and equipment depots since 2022.🟠 Increased intensity after 2025 with mid-range UAVs (Fire Point systems).🟠 Strikes concentrated near railway hubs and rear settlements in occupied territories.🟠 Result: fragmentation and relocation of storage deeper into occupied or Russian territory.➡️ 04. Ground logistics disruption (30–150 km zone)🟠 New generation UAVs expanded strike depth significantly.Increasing attacks on: 🟠 moving convoys🟠 supply trucks🟠 air defense escortsReported changes in Russian logistics: 🟠 convoy restrictions and escort requirements🟠 relocation of depots deeper (60–100+ km)Operational impact: reduced convoy efficiency and slower resupply cycles.➡️ 05. Main road supply routesUkrainian drone strikes focus on four main logistics corridors:🟠 Pokrovsk direction routes (T-05-11, M04/E50) – frontline supply disruptionDonetsk–Luhansk axis (Debaltseve, Horlivka, Yenakiieve) – key internal logistics network🟠 Donetsk–Mariupol (N-20) – major southern distribution route🟠 E58 coastal highway (“Azov Ring”) – critical strategic corridor along Sea of AzovEffects:vehicles increasingly struck at depthnight convoys becoming commonsome routes partially abandoned or rerouted➡️ 05C. “Azov Ring” infrastructure🟠 Long-term Russian project linking Rostov–Mariupol–Melitopol–Crimea.🟠 Uses E105 and E58 highways as backbone.Key hub: Melitopol.🟠 Ukraine targets electricity and telecom infrastructure to degrade coordination.🟠 Construction continues, but vulnerability to drone strikes remains high.➡️ 06. Moving forward🟠 Road closures increasing (E105, E50, Donetsk–Yasynuvata–Horlivka corridor).🟠 Russia shifting to secondary routes due to repeated strikes.🟠 Some drivers reportedly refuse fuel transport despite high pay.🟠 Logistics increasingly fragmented and unpredictable.➡️ Overall conclusionThe report describes a progressive collapse of Russian logistics efficiency in occupied Ukraine, driven by three waves:🟠 HIMARS (deep precision strikes on command/logistics nodes)🟠 FPV drones (frontline kill zone expansion)🟠 Mid-range UAVs (systemic interdiction of roads, rail, and convoys)🟠 The result is a shift from centralized logistics to fragmented, high-risk, and lower-capacity supply networks, with increasing dependence on alternative routes and smaller transport units

💭🗞 🤔 🐵 🏹   WSJ: EU officials fear Russia could test or provoke NATO within the next 12 months as Moscow’s war against Ukraine stalls 💬  European security officials warn Russia could test NATO cohesion by targeting the Baltics, Arctic territories, or Swedish/Danish islands in the Baltic Sea; 💬  Concerns are growing amid possible future cuts to the U.S. military presence in Europe and uncertainty over Washington’s commitment to NATO under Donald Trump; 💬  Officials say Russia currently shows no signs of moving troops or equipment for an attack outside Ukraine; 💬  Western intelligence estimates Russia is losing nearly 35,000 troops per month, exceeding current recruitment capacity; 💬  EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas warned the Kremlin may consider escalation to justify a future mobilization; 💬  Estonian intelligence says Russia technically can mobilize more forces, though it would create serious domestic risks for the Kremlin; 💬  German lawmaker Norbert Röttgen said expanding the war against NATO would be highly risky for Putin, but noted his history of taking major risks; 💬  European officials believe Russia’s long-term goal of reshaping the balance of power in Europe remains unchanged.

💭❗️ 🚀 ➡️  The 'kinetic' destruction myth of the 'Oreshnik' missile has been debunked and roughly comparable to 36 Shahed drones, — Defense Express 💬  The Russian narrative claims the missile carries tungsten kinetic rods capable of penetrating deeply buried targets with extreme destructive power. However, analysis of a third impact site suggests otherwise📰 The average craters left by 'Oreshnik' submunitions in ordinary soil are up to 3 meters in diameter and up to 2 meters deep💬  Early analysis of the Bila Tserkva strike challenges claims about 'Oreshnik' tungsten kinetic rods, noting crater sizes of up to 3 m wide and 2 m deep and no evidence of a new warhead type.⏲️ The damage pattern is similar to previous strikes in Dnipro and Lviv, suggesting no fundamentally new warhead type is involved⏺️ Estimated impact energy is about 220–400 MJ, roughly equivalent to 52–95 kg of TNT equivalent, though this is only a rough comparison due to the different nature of kinetic impact versus chemical explosion➡️🛵   Each missile reportedly carries 36 submunitions, giving an overall effect roughly comparable to 36 'Shahed' drones with enhanced warheads, though the damage mechanism is fundamentally different (kinetic vs explosive fragmentation)➡️❗️  Russia is reportedly planning to produce about five 'Oreshnik' missiles per year in 2026 (one every 2–2.5 months), while producing 36 Shahed drones takes roughly 8 hours

💭❗️ 🛵 ➡️  'Oboronka' has revealed what today’s Alabuga SEZ looks like — the main production hub for Shahed strike drones 💬 Heavy security and protection: — production facilities are covered with anti-drone netting⏺ a dense air defense system is deployed around the complex (including Pantsir-S1 and Tor systems);⏺ dozens of air defense positions have been identified around the zone.💬 Massive expansion: ⏺ active construction of new production workshops in the north and south of the SEZ;⏺ large-scale development of dormitories for workers and students;⏺ expansion of office and training infrastructure for thousands of personnel.💬 'Alabuga Polytechnic' as a personnel pipeline: ⏺ rapid growth in student numbers;⏺ dual system: education + industrial work from the first year;⏺ essentially a structured pipeline for staffing drone production at scale.💬 Aggressive recruitment and mass propaganda: ⏺ hundreds of advertising integrations across YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram;⏺ millions of views across promotional content;⏺ main messaging focused on high salaries (up to ~150,000 RUB/month);⏺ active recruitment of youth from poorer regions of Russia and foreign countries.💬 Foreign labor involvement: ⏺ programs such as 'Alabuga Start' used to attract foreign workers;⏺ recruits from Asia, Africa, and Latin America;⏺ recruitment often framed as education, work, and social mobility opportunities;⏺ reports and leaks allege discriminatory internal practices toward some groups.💬 Strict control system: ⏺ internal security service with access to students’ digital devices and communications;⏺ monitoring, inspections, and behavioral control mechanisms;⏺ fines and contractual restrictions that make leaving the program difficult.💬 Ideological component: — 'military-patriotic education' programs⏺ Soviet-era symbolism and militarized messaging across the campus;⏺ lectures and large-scale ideological events for thousands of students;⏺ paintball 'military reconstructions' used as motivation and selection tools.💬 Military function of the complex: ⏺ internal units focused on drone countermeasures⏺ development of drone-based air defense systems;⏺ continuous strengthening of defenses due to Ukrainian drone strike threats.💬 Conclusion: Alabuga is not just an industrial zone — it is a large-scale military-industrial ecosystem combining production, recruitment, education, ideology, and strict internal control, ensuring continuous output of drones used in the war against Ukraine.

💭❗️ 🗞 🇺🇦   Ukrainian Drone Pilots Turn a Military Exercise in Sweden into a Critical Warning for NATO, according to Associated Press 📰 🇸🇪   The drill, involving Sweden, the U.S., and other NATO forces, simulated a crisis scenario on Gotland, including sabotage, power outages, and food shortages.🌟  A group of Ukrainian drone pilots, invited to train Western forces in drone warfare, demonstrated in a Swedish exercise how effectively drones can overwhelm conventional defenses💬  A 24-year-old pilot with the call sign 'Tarik' said the exercise had to be paused three times as NATO troops adjusted tactics, adding that in real combat 'they would have been dead'💬  Another pilot, 'Karat,' said Swedish forces have potential but need major improvements in drone tactics and command understanding, describing how Ukrainian FPV drone operators often 'work blindly' on the front line➡️ U.S. Brig. Gen. Curtis King said NATO must improve survivability and detection systems, while also developing integrated radar networks across allies — noting that 'we’re not there yet'🇺🇸  The exercise highlighted a key message: NATO forces need to rapidly adapt to drone warfare, with Ukraine’s battlefield experience seen as critical for future defense planning.

💭❗️🫡 ✈️ 🔵  Every third sortie is successful: how the 412 'Nemesis' brigade destroys Russian air defenses with mid-strike drones — explained by the brigade’s deputy commander in an interview* 👇  Click the bottom-right arrow to see the full text 🎤 When did you start using 'mid-strike' drones?💭  We started before the term existed. We simply used heavy bombers for one-way missions when we knew a high-value target was there. That was already 'mid-strike'➡️  We have confirmed destruction of a 'Buk' air defense system at 50–57 km — at the time, that was beyond expected reach.🎤 How many targets have you hit?💭 As of May 2, 2026, the brigade has hit or destroyed 83 Russian air defense systems (TOR, Buk, S-300 radars, launchers, command and support vehicles)🎤  Why can’t Russian air defense protect itself?💭 ⏺ We destroy more systems than Russia can replace, so their air defense becomes thinner and less effective;⏺ They also move systems deeper to protect critical infrastructure, reducing coverage at the front;⏺ Their Soviet-era radars are also poorly suited to detect small composite drones;⏺ At the same time, they do shoot down drones — but at the cost of expensive missiles, which we aim to exhaust;⏺ Low altitude flight, small size, and tactics give us an advantage.🎤  How is a 'mid-strike' mission carried out?💭 It starts with intelligence ➡️ target selection ➡️ planning ➡️ coordinated executionIt’s not a single drone strike — it’s often a multi-layered operation with several systems working togetherSometimes mid-strike opens the way for deeper strikes. But today it is no longer a fixed pattern — operations are fully dynamic.🎤 Is 'mid-strike' mass warfare?💭  No. It is not mass like artillery. It is precision strikes on high-value targets, often requiring complex intelligence and multiple assets per mission🎤 What is effectiveness?💭 About one in three sorties results in a successful strike.But 'hit' ≠ 'destroyed'. Damage, mission success, and target confirmation all matter. Even unsuccessful strikes still create pressure — forcing enemy air defense to react, relocate, and waste resources.🎤 Operator training⏺ Operators require advanced training, similar to aviation;⏺ They progress step by step from simpler drones to complex systems;⏺ Basic proficiency: 30–60 days, but real skill develops over time with simulators and experience.🎤 Future developmentKey directions:⏺longer range;⏺heavier payloads;⏺better autonomy and guidance;⏺improved communication;⏺ higher maneuverability.➡️ Future systems will be more specialized: for moving targets, static targets, and deeper strikes.❗️  We expect major — even revolutionary — changes within a year🎤 Production & feedback⏺ Ukrainian manufacturers respond quickly to feedback. Development is done in close cooperation with units;⏺ We work directly with crews, test systems in real conditions, and force rapid improvements;⏺ Quality is currently 'satisfactory plus', but improving fast.🎤 Main limitation💭 The biggest bottleneck is not pilots or targets — it is the number of available systems🟡  If supply increases, we can scale crews and operations immediatelyBut these are expensive systems, so they must be used against high-value targets only🎤 Strategic impact💭 'Middle-strike' changes the war by eliminating safe rear areas🏹  It forces both sides to disperse logistics, move infrastructure deeper, and stretch supply lines⏺ This slows operations, increases logistical pressure, and directly affects the front⏺ It is not just about destruction — it is about systemic pressure on the entire battlefield structure.

💭❗️🟠   A new ring of air defense using 'Pantsir' systems is being built around Moscow, — reports Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 🟡  According to Osint analitycs, Russia’s air defense situation is becoming increasingly strained:➡️ In April, Russia lost around 30 air defense systems (many confirmed by video and geolocation). In the first 8 days of May, 10 more confirmed hits were recorded;➡️ At the same time, Russia is prioritizing protection of key sites inside the country rather than front-line areas:🟠 About 300 'Pantsir' systems are deployed across mainland Russia;🟠 Over 100 systems defend Moscow, around 30 protect Putin’s residence in Valdai, and others cover key ports in St. Petersburg and the Black Sea.➡️ Air defenses are also concentrated around oil refineries, industrial zones, military bases (including facilities linked to Shahed/Geran production in Alabuga), airports, and ports. Much of Russia’s air defense production is now directed toward protecting the homeland from drone threats;➡️ There is also a risk of missile shortages as priority is given to defending Moscow, leaving occupied Ukrainian territories less protected;➡️ Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are increasingly targeting radar systems, degrading Russian air defense effectiveness, a trend that could intensify, especially in occupied southern Ukraine. 

💭🤯 ⬛️ 👀  Returned from captivity with a captive: the remarkable story of a Ukrainian soldier who spent two weeks in a dugout with a Russian* 👇  Click the bottom-right arrow to see the full text 🇺🇦  34-year-old Ukrainian serviceman from Odesa, Vadym Lietunov, ended up in an enemy dugout after his position was destroyed and he was wounded — and spent two weeks there with a Russian soldier➡️  At the end of February, his shelter was hit. His brother-in-arm was killed. Dazed by the blast, Lietunov managed to get out and instinctively ran toward Ukrainian linesIn the forest, he came across a dugout and went inside💬  I saw a man aiming a rifle at me. I said which brigade I was from, that we’d been bombed. He told me: 'Come in'. I stepped inside — and heard the accent. He was Russian, Lietunov recalls. I said: 'You’re not one of ours, right? Please don’t kill me.'👮  Inside was a Russian soldier named Nikita — unstable, a former convict and drug addict who had ended up at the front in exchange for freedom. He had already tried to leave his position but had been sent back➡️  The Russian ordered him to undress and searched his belongings, looking for drugs — influenced by propaganda claiming Ukrainian soldiers carry them😈  Once a day, a Mavic drone dropped minimal supplies into the dugout: porridge, jam, and a little water. The Russian shared what he had — a piece of chocolate and a sip of water from a bottle capAccording to Lietunov, Nikita had severe mood swings💬  He could suddenly become aggressive, press a pistol to my forehead and say, ‘I’ll kill you now’… and then change his mind a second later, he saysOver time, Lietunov’s condition worsened — gangrene set in, and a toe turned blackHe asked Nikita to shoot him outside the dugout so his body could be found and returned to his family💬  He got angry and refused. He was afraid to go outside — he knew it was dangerous, Lietunov saysNikita himself began complaining about the conditions — collecting rainwater and sometimes even 'drinking his own urine.'❗️  One morning he said, ‘Maybe I should surrender to you?’ I said, ‘Don’t.’ But I added that conditions in Ukraine are decent — three meals a day, cigarettes, the Geneva Convention, Lietunov recallsWhen they finally ran out of water, they went out to search for some. A Ukrainian drone spotted them💬  I pointed to my clothes. I was wearing my pixel-pattern army UBACS shirt — that’s basically how they recognized me, he says❗️  At first, drone operators thought they were Russians and even launched a kamikaze drone. By sheer luck, the strike failed. A second attack was aborted after a commander recognized his soldier➡️  They stayed in the dugout until a Ukrainian armored personnel carrier approached. Eventually, the Russian chose to surrender and destroyed his phoneHe was given coffee with condensed milk and sugar, then handed over to Ukrainian special services❗️  Lietunov’s unit, the 118th Brigade, had presumed him dead and informed his family his chances of return were minimal. He lost a toe due to gangrene and is now undergoing rehabilitation in Odesa🫡 It’s a one-in-a-million chance, he says of his story. I was a captive. But in the end, I came out with a captive