Dancers at the Knife’s Edge [4/4]Загальні висновки в репорті - просто переказ всіх вказаних в ньому проблем:First, much of the stockpile is stored at a single facility. While the facility is hardened and well-guarded against attack, it is a case of highly concentrated risk. Further, the infrastructure around this facility is basic, possibly with only a single narrow road in and out; blocking these roads could seriously delay operations. The highly centralized nature of the system also requires frequent transport of warheads by road or rail over long distances. While transport units boast about their exemplary safety records and are trained for contingencies, this does increase opportunities for accidents or wartime interdiction. …The literature also suggested past issues with disorganized and lax storage facilities and procedures, as evidenced by health problems among personnel. … The existence of outdated computer operating systems at least some facilities in recent years may suggest ongoing issues with dated infrastructure. … Finally, there are indications that the PLARF may increasingly have trouble retaining quality personnel. Recruiting and retaining educated and skilled personnel has been an ongoing challenge for the PLA as a whole, and the PLARF will likely exacerbate this problem by forcing more skilled engineers and technicians to serve in remote hardship posts on short notice. А ось більш цікаво - це аналіз навантаження на support units. Всім, дотичним до війська у воюючій країні, знайома ситуація "trying to do more with less", де із обмежених матеріальних та перш за все людських ресурсів командування намагається вижати якомога більше результату. Ось що неочікувано було почути - це те, що така ж ситуація може повторюватись не просто у не воюючій країні, а ще й у найбільш чутливому роді військ:Finally, simple math suggests that the PLARF may be trying to do more with less. It is well established that the PLARF has rapidly expanded in size in the past decade. In just a five-year period from 2016-2021, it increased the number of missile brigades under its command by approximately 35 percent, and the majority of these brigades were equipped with nuclear or dual capable systems. … Readiness levels have also increased, with brigades increasingly switching over to a launch-on-warning posture which likely places higher demands on its support network. Under these conditions, one would expect commensurate growth in nuclear support units. However, available open-source literature provides little evidence of this. … It is thus worth asking if a system that was designed in a simpler and smaller-scale time of minimal deterrence doctrine is able to handle this workload - in some cases double the workload of only a few years earlier - or whether such a system would be increasingly stressed, perhaps even to the point of breaking down if prolonged high demands were placed on it in a crisis. Цікаво жити у світі, де свій внесок в початок ядерної війни може зробити не злий умисел і не логіка ескалації великого конфлікту, а банальна жадібність китайських генералів, які перенавантажують існуючі стратегічні ядерні сили без належного розширення штату.